A Preventive Model of Utilitarian Moral Education with Emphasis on Undesirable Conducts in Mill’s viewpoint
Subject Areas :
shahnaz shahriari neisiani
1
()
Reza Ali Nowrozi
2
()
Mohammad Meshkat
3
()
Keywords: Mill, Utilitarian Ethics, Undesirable Conducts, Moral Education, Preventive Model,
Abstract :
The purpose of this research is to formulate a preventive model of the utilitarian moral education with emphasis on undesirable conducts in Mill’s viewpoint. The method used is the “descriptive-analytical” method. Undesirable conducts include wrong conducts (violating rights and comfort of others), and unpleasant conducts, the existence of which can be explained with fails in duties. The goal of moral education is happiness, and moral education includes dimensions of prevention and punishment. Punishments appear in the following forms: reprobation for violating the rights and disturbing the comfort, and losing the positive attention of others because of the behaviors lacking personal dignity. By prevention, we mean primary prevention that is governed by the principles of justice and contemplation. The governance of justice is related to the conducts violating the rights, but governance of the principle of contemplation is in preventing wrong conducts, and in meanings of “care of soul” and care of reasons. In unpleasant conducts, the ruling principle is the contemplation with aforementioned meanings. These findings support Mill’s belief that "the main foundations of moral life in the new age are justice and contemplation." Prevention strategies referring to the two types of undesirable conducts are strengthening conscience and giving insights. The linkage of strategies to principles is presented in the preventive model. According to the findings on prevention, considering reasonable punishment for wrong conducts and paying attention to justice and contemplation in explaining undesirable conducts is a positive aspect of Mill's perspectiv. However, his views on unpleasant conducts have been criticized, because interventions and punishments considered for these conducts lack the necessary performance for guaranteeing the prevention of self-harm and reforming the holders of unpleasant conducts. Also his opinion about people's owing to one another lacks the strong executive support for action in relation to the holders of these conducts. Removing these weaknesses requires a revision of Mill's harm principle and correcting and reconsructing some of his beliefs.